wrote in The Study of the History of Mathematics in 1937. "Take the mathematical developments out of the history of science, and you suppress the skeleton that supported and kept together the rest. Mathematics gives to science its innermost unity and cohesion, which can never be entirely replaced with props and buttresses or with roundabout connections, no matter how many of these may be introduced."
1 To Sarton and his contemporaries the interdependence between the history of science and history of mathematics was self-evident, as one cannot make sense of the development of science without the corresponding developments in mathematics. Ancient science required Euclidean geometry, Newtonian physics required the calculus, general relativity utilizes non-Euclidean geometry, and so on. It was therefore natural that 20 th century pioneers of the history of mathematics such as Otto Neugebauer and Bartel Van der Waerden were also founders of the history of science, making little distinction between the two.
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But even as Neugebauer and Van der Waerden were making their most lasting contributions to the historiography of science in the 1950's cracks were already appearing in the unified façade of the history of science and the history of mathematics. Sarton and his immediate successors had viewed science as a grand rational edifice, and its history as a chronicle of how this structure came to be. But under the influence of Alexandre Koyre, and later Thomas Kuhn, the field of the history of science moved away from this comforting view. Instead of concentrating on the rational stepping stones that led to modern science, they opted to look at the role that other, "external" factors, played in its development. Philosophical doctrines, religious convictions, and magical practices were soon invoked to explain various aspects of scientific development, and to these later generations of historians added political ideologies and interests, racial and gendered biases, and more. The elegant edifice of the founding generation was replaced by a much more haphazard and unpredictable enterprise, shaped by myriad different factors, both rational and irrational.
One casualty of the social and cultural turn in the history of science was its close alliance with the history of mathematics. If science was no longer a unified rational edifice, then it no longer needed a rigorous rational skeleton to hold it together. The truly interesting questions to historians now were about the relationship between science and its broad context, not its core rationality. A strong emphasis on the role of mathematics, it seemed, would pull the field back to its positivist roots and away from the cultural study that historians cherished. Mathematics became something of an embarrassment to the field, an uncomfortable reminder of science's rational structure to a community committed to investigating its social and cultural underpinnings. Sarton's rational skeleton had become, in effect, a skeleton in the closet.
This is not to say that historians of science neglected mathematics altogether.
Mathematics played such an important role in the development of the physical sciences that it was impossible to ignore, and the best historians of these fields (Peter Galison and
Norton Wise come to mind) have had no trouble handling the technical complexities of higher mathematics. But even when mathematics did make an appearance, it was usually tangential to the main argument. Most often it served as a set of powerful tools in the hands of practicing scientists, who used it to construct their theories. Mathematics was hardly ever interrogated, historicized or contextualized in the way that scientific theories and practices are. It was more or less accepted as a useful but a-historical construct, of which not much more can be said. The interesting questions lay elsewhere.
Marginalized within the history of science and ultimately forming their own field, historians of mathematics were effectively insulated from the intellectual currents that were reshaping the history of science. While historians of mathematic still could and did produce superb accounts of the technical and conceptual development of mathematics, their focus had narrowed considerably. Much of the field covered by scholars such as Neugebauer and Van der Waerden had been ceded to the history of science, leaving historians of mathematics to concentrate mostly on in-depth internalist studies of mathematical work. As the field split off from the broader history of science it also turned in on itself, focusing on issues that were of little interest to scholars in neighboring fields.
The insularity of the field has been a source of much soul-searching among scholars in the history of mathematics. In a 1990 essay Ivor Grattan-Guinness referred to the field as "a classical example of a ghetto subject," and others have followed up in a similar vein. Integrating the study of science and mathematics in this way requires, above all, a new kind of history of mathematics. This does not mean that the traditional in-depth studies that focus on the technical side of past mathematics will be shunted aside. There will always be a central place for such work in the history of mathematics, and any work in the field depends on them. It does mean, however, that these studies should be supplemented by others that emphasize the historical contingency of mathematics, how its standards and practices varied over time and place, and how it interacts with other cultural factors. These studies will not only make the history of mathematics more interesting and relevant to historians of science; it will also make possible the kind of studies that integrate mathematics and science and show how the two shape each other over time.
Over the past few years the trickle of such historical works on mathematics has turned into a steady stream that seems to be increasing by the day. Three of the essays in this After decades of separation the history of science and the history of mathematics are now drawing closer together. As the papers in this section demonstrate, the terms of their new union are still being negotiated, but it is already clear that they will be very different than they were in the days of Sarton, Neugebauer, and Van der Waerden. Mathematics will no longer be the rational skeleton of science, nor a powerful -but ultimately steriletoolbox in the hands of scientists. Instead it will be a dynamic historical field in its own right, drawing on both mathematical and non-mathematical factors, all in close interaction with natural science. I believe that this coming-together will be enormously beneficial to both fields, though it is too early to predict how it will shape them in the long run. At the very least it will correct an anomalous situation that has deprived both the history of science and the history of mathematics of a large portion of their subject matter, and an even larger portion of their explanatory power.
